Indonesia Military Powers Up

Indonesian Marines take cover during a beach assault exercise at Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands as part of this year's Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2008 exercise. RIMPAC is the world's largest multinational exercise and is scheduled biennially by the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Participants include the United States, Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Netherlands, Peru, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Paul D. Honnick (Released)

January 18 2012:On Monday, Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro, flanked by the country’s military leadership, announced that after 10 years of frugality on the part of the military designed to give precedence to political reform, the country was now entering an intensive period of military procurement. Coming from many countries, such talk would sound reckless, if not dangerous. But coming from Indonesia, it should be welcomed.

Purnomo also spelled out his 2012 wish list, which includes tanks, multiple launch rocket systems, a guided missile destroyer, and retrofits for ex-U.S. F-16s and ex-Australian C-130 transport planes. And much more new equipment is to follow before the end of President Yudhoyono’s term in 2015, not least three new South Korean submarines.

For the first time in recent memory, the Indonesian defense ministry has money in its pocket. Announcing the acquisition of an additional six Su-30 Sukhoi fighter aircraft over the weekend, Purnomo could be heard to boast: “Our economy is very strong and we have a defense budget of Rp 150 trillion [$16.3 billion].” While that figure represents a multi-year procurement budget, Purnomo is right to feel flush. In December, the government decided to revise the defense allocation upwards, giving defense a 53 percent year-on-year increase. That presents Jakarta with a 2012 defense budget of $7.9 billion – a total that should finally bring the defense budget above the 1 percent of GDP mark (just).

It has long been the stated aim of the Yudyohono administration to elevate defense spending to 1.5 percent of GDP by 2015. Analysts have often speculated that the government lacks the political will to make that happen, but the huge 2012 budget hike means that this goal is now attainable. Allocating 1.5 percent of GDP to defense in 2015 would yield a defense budget in the $14 to 15 billion range, assuming the Indonesian economy continues to grow at 6 percent to 7 percent annually. That means that Jakarta now needs to grow its defense budget by 20 percent to 25 percent in 2013, 2014 and 2015 to reach its target – which is doable, so long as the wider economy stays healthy. And since the Indonesian economy is exceptionally well insulated against global shocks, continued growth is likely.

The numbers are highly significant, because a Southeast Asia in which Indonesia has a $15 billion defense budget starts to look like a very different place. It would see Indonesia overtake Singapore as the region’s biggest military spender, and leave others like Malaysia and Thailand trailing a long way behind. Since Indonesia is Southeast Asia’s biggest country by far, its neighbors will hopefully look on this as a natural development and not try to compete – which they would in any case struggle to do. So long as Indonesia remains on its current trajectory of democratic consolidation, and it remains the hub of the ASEAN community, its emergence as a military power shouldn’t destabilize the region.

Indonesia’s rise is naturally attracting attention. China’s Defence Minister, Gen. Liang Guanglie, met the Indonesian ambassador on Monday, in an encounter that Xinhua described under the headline “China, Indonesia eye for [sic] closer military links.” But mainly it’s China that’s keen to foster closer military ties with Indonesia. Apart from a joint Sino-Indonesian missile production program initiated in early 2011, China is yet to find a significant role in Indonesia’s rise to strategic prominence. While Australia, the Netherlands, Russia, South Korea and the United States are now actively all involved in the re-equipping of the Indonesian armed forces – often on terms that are quite favorable to Jakarta – China has made few inroads. Its offer of JF-17 fighters, for example, doesn’t appear to have aroused much enthusiasm among the Indonesians.

Indonesia’s military modernization won’t be without its setbacks: already, attempts to buy Dutch Leopard 2 tanks have become bogged down in parliament. But with no shortage of friends, and adequate levels of defense funding for the first time in well over a decade, Indonesia seems close to standing up as a regional power. Furthermore, by maintaining a friendly distance from both China and the United States, as Jakarta seems determined to do, it can once again become a leader of non-aligned countries, and an anchor of stability in the Asia-Pacific.

Trefor Moss is an independent journalist based in Hong Kong. He covers Asian politics, defence and security, and was Asia-Pacific Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly until 2009.

Source: the Diplomat

Indonesia’s Submarine Play

KRI Cakra-401, Indonesia submarine. (Photo: DID)

January 19 2012: The latest $ 1.1 billion contract for three Type-209/1400 diesel-electric submarines looks set to breathe new life into the Indonesian Navy (Tentera Nasional Indonesia – Angkatan Laut or TNI-AL). It represents the third major TNI-AL purchase after the acquisition of new corvettes and landing ships since 2000 and has also been described as a move to “maintain power balance in the region,” prompting various analysts to attribute the purchase to Jakarta’s attempt to play regional submarine “catch-up.”

For more than three decades, TNI-AL operated two German-built Type-209 submarines. However, many deem them insufficient for Indonesia’s wide array of maritime security needs given its vast archipelagic expanse.

As far as the TNI-AL is concerned, the minimum required capabilities are circumscribed by the Defense Strategic Plan 2024, which called for at least 10 submarines. Even back during the early Cold War years, the TNI-AL’s fleet of Soviet-supplied Whiskey-class submarines were barely sufficient. Assuming mandated needs for routine maintenance and training cycles, only one Type-209 boat is available at all times. This submarine force will most likely be stretched to its limits in times of crisis.

Still, the pair of submarines does offer a modicum of “fleet-in-being” deterrent against potential foes considering decades of experience gleaned by TNI-AL’s submarine crews and their familiarity with the Indonesian archipelagic environment, which will certainly be exploited to maximize the deterrent effects of this tiny force. It isn’t presumptuous to assume that the two Type-209s have already completed a major portion of their useful operational lifespan notwithstanding recent refurbishment. The new submarines may partially replace and eventually substitute the existing pair, thus leaving the TNI-AL with only three operational boats by end of 2025.

Such a force is still small and barely sufficient for Indonesia’s needs. In contrast, Vietnam, also with a significant coastal geography, will be able to muster six submarines once its Russian-built Kilo Project-636 boats become operational before 2020. Singapore, with a considerably smaller coast to cover, will probably muster four submarines assuming that the ageing ex-Swedish Sjöormen-class is retired and then supplanted by the newly-inducted Västergotlands.

From a technical perspective, the newly-acquired Type-209/1400s were far from what an earlier TNI-AL chief once promised back in 2009, namely to be “more superior” to those possessed by neighboring navies. Even though they sold the Type-209 to Indonesia, the South Koreans no longer rely on this class, which is now gradually being supplanted by the more advanced Sohn Won-Il class (Project KSS-2) which is a modified German Type-214 variant. Therefore, the Type-209/1400 represents little incremental capability over existing Type-209 models.

Moreover, the new boats aren’t known to be equipped with “breakthrough” capabilities that may otherwise tip the balance of naval power in Southeast Asia. For instance, there’s no provision known for air-independent propulsion that can prolong endurance underwater as in the case with Singapore’s Västergotlands. Even if TNI-AL’s new boats can utilize submerged-launch anti-ship cruise missiles, this capability is not new, given that Malaysia’s Scorpene-class submarines are already outfitted with the SM-39 Exocet. The Vietnamese Kilos, meanwhile, are reported to be armed with Russian-designed Klub-S missiles.

In sum, quantitatively and qualitatively, TNI-AL’s newest submarine purchase may not significantly affect the regional balance of naval power. However, this acquisition reflects an unprecedented expansion of the regional submarine inventory. From a maritime security and safety point of view, this still warrants concern.

On the one hand, the confined Southeast Asian maritime geography – characterized by semi- enclosed and narrow water-bodies – makes for excellent submarine operations (though it’s a headache for anti-submarine hunters). On the other hand, this provides an ideal recipe for potential incidents, inadvertent or otherwise. Virtually all submarines operated by regional navies are equipped with signal intelligence capabilities and this amplifies the risk of naval incidents at sea with potential security ramifications. This is especially so given sensitivities over longstanding maritime-related disputes.

Moreover, regional submarine rescue capacity is far from adequate considering the numbers of submarines in or about to enter service. To date, only Singapore can muster a full-fledged submarine rescue capability in the form of the Swift Rescue submarine rescue vessel and its DSAR-6 submersible. Currently, the Malaysian and Indonesian navies don’t possess equivalent capabilities and their ongoing modernization programs don’t appear to include the acquisition of such.

By comparison, most Northeast Asian submarine operators possess relatively significant submarine emergency response capabilities. Japan, for instance, possesses dedicated, specialized capabilities for complex submarine rescue operations. Even the antiquated North Korean Navy possesses a Kowan-class catamaran-hulled rescue ship equipped with a rudimentary diving bell for its force of over 20 operational combat submarines.

Southeast Asian countries can leverage an earlier agreement from late last year to bolster regional naval cooperation by considering collective submarine emergency response capacity-building. Given the operational sensitivities of national submarine activities, confidence-building measures such as zonal restrictions on submarine operations aren’t likely to materialize. However, collaboration in submarine emergency response offers an alternative avenue. In this regard, Singapore can play a leading role in planting the seed for such a capacity in Southeast Asia.

One way to do so is to pool submarine emergency response capacity and devise regional protocols to deal with contingencies related to submarine incidents. However, no regional cooperation can wholly substitute capacity-building at the national level. Existing submarine operators and aspirants should ensure that such capacity is prudently developed in parallel with the introduction of submarine capabilities. As it stands, while Southeast Asian navies are busily seeking an underwater combat capability, most if not all of them appear to have neglected this crucial issue.

Koh Swee Lean Collin is an associate research fellow in the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Source: the Diplomat